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Executive summary 
 
This summary describes the interim findings of a project commissioned by the Sutton Trust to 
develop policy proposals for improving the effectiveness of teachers in England, with a particular 
focus on teachers serving disadvantaged pupils. The research evidence shows that improving the 
effectiveness of teachers would have a major impact on the performance of the country’s schools; 
this work aims to develop specific, evidence-based proposals to achieve this. 
 
The project includes an international literature review (based largely on major academic papers 
already published) as well as new research findings for the UK. This summary draws out some of the 
implications of the findings for workforce policies for the teaching profession in England
1
, from 
teacher training to the retention and promotion of highly effective teachers. The work is being 
undertaken by a group of leading education economists: Richard Murphy in conjunction with 
Stephen Machin at the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics, with 
advice from Eric Hanushek, based at the Hoover Institution at StanfordUniversity in the United 
States. 
 
Teacher impacts 
 
• The difference between a very effective teacher
2
 and a poorly performing teacher
3
 is large. 
For example during one year with a very effective maths teacher, pupils gain 40% more in 
their learning than they would with a poorly performing maths teacher4.  
 
• The effects of high-quality teaching are especially significant for pupils from disadvantaged 
backgrounds: over a school year, these pupils gain 1.5 years’ worth of learning with very 
effective teachers, compared with 0.5 years with poorly performing teachers. In other 
words, for poor pupils the difference between a good teacher and a bad teacher is a whole 
year’s learning. 
 
• Bringing the lowest-performing5 10% of teachers in the UK up to the average would greatly 
boost attainment and lead to a sharp improvement in the UK’s international ranking. All 
other things equal, in 5 years the UK’s rank amongst OECD countries would improve from 
21
st
 in Reading to as high as 7
th
, and from 22
nd
 in Maths to as high as 12
th 
(0.22 Standard 
Deviations); over 10 years (the period a child is in the UK school system before the PISA 
examinations
6
) the UK would improve its position to as high as 3
rd
 in Reading, and as high as 
5
th
 in Maths (0.41 Standard Deviations).  
                                                            
1
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 A ‘very effective teacher’ is a teacher in the 84
th
 percentile according to value added scores, which are a 
measure of the impact a teacher has on pupils’ progress. We chose the 84
th
 percentile because it is one 
standard deviation above the mean. Around one in every six teachers would be at or above this level. 
3
 A ‘poorly performing teacher’ is a teacher in the 16
th
 percentile according to value added scores. We chose 
the 16
th
 percentile because it is one standard deviation below the mean. Around one in every six teachers 
would be at or below this level. 
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5
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6
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 3 
• It is very difficult to predict how good a teacher will be without observing them in a 
classroom; paper qualifications and personal characteristics tell us very little. Gender, race, 
teaching experience, undergraduate university attended, advanced degrees, teacher 
certification and tenure explain less than 8% of teacher quality7. 
Teacher policies 
These two underlying facts – that the difference between good and bad teachers is very large and 
that effectiveness is very difficult to predict before teachers enter the classroom – have major 
implications for the way in which the labour market for teachers should operate. Specifically, these 
facts should change the way we think about selection into teaching, the nature of teacher training, 
the professional development of teachers, and the management of under-performing teachers. 
Furthermore the review highlights many of the problems associated with using solely test 
performance data to evaluate the effectiveness of teachers. Even value added teacher performance 
measures have been shown to be unstable
8
 and contain potential biases
9
.  Personal evaluations, 
where the mentor has no incentive to misreport, are found to be highly correlated to future pupil 
learning
10
. Many of the pay for performance programmes that use only test scores have found little 
signs of improvement
11
. Personal evaluations also avoid other issues associated with using test 
scores in pay for performance programmes, such as teaching to the test, narrowing of the taught 
curriculum and focusing on the marginal pupils12.   
The review of research evidence suggests that the following policies have the potential to improve 
teacher effectiveness. During the next stage of the project we will seek feedback from experts and 
teachers to develop these further. 
• Major reforms are needed to the performance and pay system for teachers, with 
assessment based on three core factors: improvement in results in the classroom, reviews 
by headteachers, and external appraisals. Other factors such as previous qualifications, 
previous experience, or years spent teaching should be given far less importance. 
• A new fast-track graduate entry route into teaching should be piloted in disadvantaged 
schools with aspiring teachers assessed in a classroom - either in newly created summer 
schools for children at the most disadvantaged schools, or in the new cadre of teaching 
schools. Fast track teachers would receive extra pay incentives - perhaps £5k more than 
current starting salaries - after completing a year at school to gain Qualified Teaching Status 
and provided they continue to teach in a disadvantaged school.  
• Teachers should be able to opt out of the standard promotion and pay system, and instead 
choose a more radical version which rewards high performers with extra pay and 
opportunities for faster career progression, but penalises under-performance. As well as 
improving the performance of these teachers, this would make the profession a more 
attractive option for talented graduates.  
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 4 
• School heads should be required to submit an annual report to Governors detailing the 
performance of their staff under this new performance and pay system, including their plans 
for professional development of teachers. Governors and inspectors need to ask how well 
heads have used their powers to reward excellence and address under-performance at the 
school – and this would play a key part in assessing the head’s own performance and pay. 
These recommendations chime with some of the proposals in the recent Government White Paper, 
The Importance of Teaching. In particular, we believe that making teaching more attractive to career 
changers, having trainee teachers spend more time in the classroom, and creating teaching schools 
to deliver initial and mid-career training would all go some way to address the challenges for the 
profession outlined here13.  
However, we believe further reforms will be needed to attract more people to teaching, and to put 
in place effective mechanisms to select, reward, develop, and manage our teachers – mechanisms 
based on actual effectiveness in the classroom, rather than tenure or a well-polished CV. 
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Teacher impact 
 
Improving the effectiveness of teachers would have a major impact on the performance of the 
country’s schools, increasing the attainment of children across the education system. Teachers are 
by far the biggest resource in schools. Spending on teachers in 2009/2010 accounted for the 
majority of expenditure by schools, standing at £16.1bn (53% of school spending) with a further 
£3.9bn (13%) spent on support staff and £0.7bn (3%) spent on supply teachers (see appendix for full 
breakdown of spending)14.  
 
There is a large body of research on how important teachers are to the academic outcomes of their 
pupils. The research finds that teachers are the most important factor within schools that policy 
makers can directly affect to improve student achievement15.  
 
The most rigorous academic papers find consistent and significant results: having a very effective
16
, 
rather than an average teacher raises each pupil’s attainment by a third of a GCSE grade (0.1-0.25 
Standard Deviations)17. The GCSE gap between poor and non-poor students is 6.08 GCSE points. 
Assuming this was generated over 8 GCSE subjects, if the poor student had very effective teachers 
(75
th
 percentile teachers) and the non poor student had underperforming teachers (25
th
 percentile 
teachers), this would reduce the gap by half, or 3.4 points18.  
 
The effect of having a very effective teacher as opposed to an average teacher is the same as the 
effect of reducing class size by ten students in Year 5 (ages 9-10) and thirteen or more students in 
Year 6(ages 10-11).19 One year with a very effective teacher adds 25-45% of an average school year 
to a pupil’s math score performance
20
. The effects of high-quality teaching are especially large for 
pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds, who gain an extra year’s worth of learning under very 
effective teachers compared to poorly performing teachers21,22. 
 
The economic argument for improving the effectiveness of teachers is also strong. Hanushek uses a 
range of estimates of teacher effects on pupil test scores and the subsequent effect of test scores on 
earnings to calculate how much teachers of differing ability are worth in terms of future earnings for 
pupils and the economy as a whole23. A teacher one standard deviation better than the average 
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 Department for Education, 2009. 
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 This encapsulates academic and non-academic achievement. Rivkin Hanushek and Kain 2005, Rockoff  2004 
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teacher, with a class size of 30, generates annually over $460,000 in present value
24
 in terms of 
future student earnings.  
 
We perform a parallel calculation for the UK using more conservative assumptions
25
, and find that 
bringing a poorly performing teacher up to the average would increase the lifetime earnings of a 
single class of 30 by £240,000-£430,000 (in present value terms).  
 
Figure 1: Impact on English classroom lifetime incomes by class size and teacher 
quality(compared with average teacher) 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the impact that teachers of differing ability have on the lifetime earnings of classes of 
different size. The economic value of an effective teacher grows with larger classes, and the 
economic costs of having an ineffective teacher are substantial. This analysis assumes a 1 standard 
deviation increase in teacher quality increases student achievement by 0.2 standard deviations. (The 
percentiles refer to a teacher’s positioning in terms of value added scores – in a group of 100, a 
teacher in the 23
rd
 percentile would expect to have a higher value added score than 23 others, but a 
lower score than everyone else.) 
 
 
Using the same magnitudes of teacher effectiveness, Hanushek (2011) considers what would be 
possible if we could truncate the bottom end of the teacher quality distribution, by training (or 
replacing) teachers to the level of a current average teacher.  Improving the least effective 8% of 
teachers in the US would increase overall student achievement by 0.4 standard deviations, bringing 
American 15 year-olds into line with their Canadian peers, an improvement of 21 places in the 
                                                            
24
 Estimated future income is discounted at 3 percent per year to calculate the present value – this is done to 
reflect the fact that money today is worth more than money in the future 
25
Calculations use average income by age for all fulltime workers in the first quarter of 2010 from the Labour 
Force Survey. It is assumed that incomes rise 1 percent per year because of overall productivity improvements 
in the economy and that future incomes are discounted at 3 percent. It assumes: One standard deviation 
increase teacher quality translates into a 0.11 to 0.2 standard deviation increase in annual student 
improvement; the labour market return to one standard deviation higher achievement is 0.13 higher earnings; 
The depreciation rate on prior learning is 0.3. 
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international PISA rankings
26
. Meanwhile, replacing 12% of the least effective teachers nationally 
would bring the US up to the level of Finland in the international rankings, an improvement of 26 
places.   
 
For this paper we have calculated the effects of bringing the bottom 10% of teachers in the UK up to 
the level of the average (10% equates to just over 40,000 teachers in England).Doing so could have a 
large effect on the UK’s PISA test scores, greatly improving the UK’s place in the international 
rankings (See Figure 2). All other things equal, in 5 years the UK’s rank amongst OECD countries 
would improve from 21
st
 in Reading to somewhere between 9
th
 and 7
th
, and from 22
nd
 in Maths to 
somewhere between 14th and 12th; over 10 years (the period a child is in the UK school system 
before the PISA examinations) the UK would improve its position to as high as 3rd in Reading, and as 
high as 5th in Maths (0.41 Standard Deviations).  
 
Figure 2: Improvement in UK PISA test scores after 10 years, with the improvement of the least 
effective teachers 
 
Figure 2 -These calculations use prior variance estimates to judge the impact of truncating the 
distribution. The high/low estimate of teacher effectiveness assumes one standard deviation in 
teacher effectiveness improves pupil outcomes by 0.2/0.11 standard deviations. The analysis applies 
to all teachers, so it can be thought of improving the effectiveness of teachers throughout the system. 
As such, it is assumed that the quality of teachers reinforces any gains that students make and the 
impacts of good instruction are cumulative over the 10 years of education prior to PISA testing. These 
                                                            
26
The international test scores used in the calculations are those produced by the OECD’s Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA). These results are based on 2003 rankings. 
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variations come from maths performance on the 2009 PSIA tests (see summary data in Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010). There are some variations in average country 
scores over time and across subjects, but these do not affect the calculations here. Authors 
calculations 
From these calculations – which show only the effects of improving the least effective teachers – it is 
clear that increasing the effectiveness of all teachers would have a large and enduring effect on both 
the performance of schools and the economy as a whole.  
We have assumed that the overall effectiveness of a teacher is comprised of two components – 
teacher talent and teacher effort – and examined the ways in which policymakers can improve 
teacher effectiveness by using policies that target these components. In this summary document we 
provide the initial policy conclusions with supporting evidence.  
 9 
Teacher policies 
 
Three pronged approach for teacher appraisals 
Major reforms are needed to the performance and pay system for teachers, with assessment 
based on three core factors: improvement in results in the classroom, reviews by headteachers, 
and external appraisals. Other factors such as previous qualifications, previous experience, or 
years spent teaching should be given far less importance. 
In the UK, great emphasis is placed on qualifications and tenure of teachers. To enter Initial Teacher 
Training (ITT) and receive Department for Education funding applicants must reach minimum 
qualification standards; once they have become teachers, their pay and prospects of promotion are 
determined to a great extent by higher qualifications and experience. This is despite the 
overwhelming evidence that shows that there is almost no link between teachers' prior education or 
experience and the achievement of their pupils (with the exception of the significant gains made in 
the first 3-5 years of a typical teaching career)27. Even taking all the relevant information that we can 
gather without observing a teacher in the classroom (gender, race, teaching experience, 
undergraduate university attended, advanced degrees, teacher certification and current tenure), we 
can only explain less than 8% of teacher effectiveness28. 
The evidence suggests that qualifications and tenure should not play such a major role in 
determining a teacher’s prospects. In other professions employees are rewarded according to how 
productive they are in the workplace. In the case of teachers this would mean relating employment 
and payment to a combination of factors – including value-added test scores showing pupil progress 
for teachers, but also judgement by expert peers, made up of both headteacher appraisals and 
assessment by external teachers. 
One of the primary goals of a teacher is to improve the academic performance of his or her pupils. In 
the past it was assumed that this could be measured easily using test scores, but recent research has 
revealed several shortcomings of this approach. Value added measures of teacher effectiveness, 
which assess progression rather than just the absolute level of attainment, have faced criticism in 
terms of their validity, stability and precision29.  Despite these issues, these value added measures 
can be significantly improved if they are averaged over multiple years, and make good indicators of 
effectiveness .
30
However evaluating performance according to specific targets may encourage 
teachers to focus on ‘gaming’ the system – for example by focussing only on particular pupils or 
‘teaching to the test’ – rather than on educating their pupils in the true sense31. 
The other way to assess teaching ability is through personal evaluations. These can be informal, with 
impressions of teaching ability being formed over time by a head of the school or head of 
department. The advantage of this method is that it is harder for the teacher to manipulate, as the 
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 Hanushek, 2003 
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 Aaronson et al., 2007 
29
Ballou, D. 2009, Goldhaber D. and M. Hansen, 2010, Rothstein, J. 2009, 2010 
30
Kane, T.J., D. Staiger, 2008, Rockoff and Speroni, 2010 
31
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evaluation would have less specific targets and also include non-academic components. The 
drawbacks of this approach are that it may be costly to implement and subject to the personal 
biases of school heads. However many schools already have internal evaluation systems of teacher 
performance in place, in the form of Performance Management. Moreover some schools currently 
have independent external high performing teachers, come in to  evaluate practicing teachers. To 
reduce the scope for personal biases heads could be incentivised into rewarding high performing 
teachers by relating their pay to overall test score gains made by pupils.    
Appraisals and measured performance in the classroom have been found to be highly correlated: 
teachers with high value added tend to receive good evaluations from heads32. Therefore there is a 
strong argument for measuring teachers’ performance using a combination of these two, with each 
approach compensating for the shortcomings of the other, but also incorporating a third element – 
external teacher appraisals.  
Fast track entry route into teaching 
A new fast-track graduate entry route into teaching should be piloted in disadvantaged schools 
with aspiring teachers assessed in a classroom - either in newly created summer schools for 
children at the most disadvantaged schools, or in the new cadre of teaching schools. Fast track 
teachers would receive extra pay incentives - perhaps £5k more than current starting salaries - 
after completing a year at school to gain Qualified Teaching Status and provided they continue to 
teach in a disadvantaged school.  
The evidence suggests that is it very difficult to predict who will make a good teacher according to 
their characteristics on paper
33
. Therefore for initial teacher training it is unclear what minimum 
qualification standards should be put in place. However, some research shows that personal 
evaluations of new trainees based on an interview and a mock classroom interaction are very good 
indicators of future teacher quality34. This approach could be used to identify unsuitable candidates 
and keep trainee numbers and hence the cost of training down.  
As stated before, the classroom is the best place to evaluate a teacher’s effectiveness, which 
suggests the award of QTS (Qualified Teacher Status) should be based more on classroom 
evaluations and pupil value-added measures over an extended period of time.   
Furthermore there is reason to believe that the selection process should be toughened. Countries 
that traditionally perform well in international league tables often have high failure rates amongst 
trainee teachers. In Singapore, 1 in 6 applicants successfully becomes a teacher and in Finland only 1 
in 10
35
. This large failure rate may put off applicants if there are large upfront costs to entering the 
selection process, such as certification (which has shown little beneficial effects on teacher quality in 
itself).  Therefore any such costs should be removed where possible, such as being paid a salary 
during the training period alongside a good starting salary. 
There is a lot of potential for increasing the use of in-the-field evaluation of trainee teachers. Of the 
40,000 new recruits into ITT in 2009/10, only 6,500 (16%) took employment-based courses (See 
table 2); this increases to 8,300 (21%) when including School Centred Initial Teacher Training (SCITT) 
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courses (which are college-based courses but with a significant amount of time spent in the 
classroom). The vast majority of those on the employment-based route are participating in the 
Graduate Teacher Programme (79%), which was “designed to offer a high-quality and cost-effective 
route into the teaching profession for suitable graduates who do not want to follow a traditional 
pre-service route” (TTA, 1996:1)
36
 (See Appendix Table 2). They provide a direct route into teaching, 
where salaries are paid (£15,000-£26,000) from the beginning of the training, which has proved to 
be appealing to young professionals – demand for places has consistently exceeded supply. A small 
but growing route into teaching is Teach First, representing 1.2% of new recruits to teacher training 
annually. Teach First is a charity run programme, who select and train in six weeks, high achieving 
graduates and places them in schools in ‘challenging circumstances37’ for a period of two years. Little 
empirical research has been done on the impact of Teach First trainees, but what has been done has 
found that these trainees generally scored as well as other more experienced teachers and 
headteachers were positive about the programme. The equivalent programme in America has been 
more heavily researched and found that these trainees performed as well traditional teachers when 
accounting for experience
38
.  
We believe a new fast track entry route into teaching for graduates could be piloted alongside these 
existing routes with aspiring teachers assessed on their teaching in a classroom environment - either 
in newly created summer schools for children based at the most disadvantaged schools, or in the 
newly established cadre of teaching schools. Fast track teachers would receive extra pay incentives - 
perhaps £5k more than current starting salaries - after completing a year in one of the schools to 
gain Qualified Teaching Status.   
High stakes option for teachers 
Teachers should be able to opt out of the standard promotion and pay system, and instead choose 
a more radical version which rewards high performers with extra pay and opportunities for faster 
career progression, but penalises under-performance. As well as improving the performance of 
these teachers, this would make the profession a more attractive option for talented graduates.  
If we aim to produce large numbers of qualified teachers through a highly selective process, we will 
need to attract very large numbers of applicants in the first instance. Clearly we could boost demand 
for places by increasing teacher salaries
39
 or improving working conditions, for example by reducing 
overtime. However increasing teacher pay by itself will not improve pupil outcomes40. The studies 
repeatedly show that large salary increases have done nothing to improve the quality of American 
teachers; the argument that we should just “pay teachers more” does not work.  
The problem is that raising salaries will make teaching more appealing to all, regardless of whether 
they have the potential to do the job well. The best that policymakers can hope for is that increasing 
basic pay attracts high quality applicants who might otherwise have gone elsewhere; the key is that 
there should be selection mechanisms in place to distinguish between high- and low-potential 
applicants. Increasing the non-pecuniary benefits of teaching would raise similar issues. 
                                                            
36
There is also the Registered Teacher Programme is the parallel route for non-graduates. 
37
 Challenging circumstances’ were defined as, less than 25% of pupils receiving 5 A*-Cs (including maths and 
English) and/or where at least 30% of the pupils are eligible for free school meals. 
38
Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb,&Wyckoff,2006; Kane, Rockoff & Staiger, 2008 
39
Dolton 1990, 2007 
40
 Hanushek 1986, Betts 1995, Grogger 1996, Ballou and Podgursky 1997.  Ballou and Podgursky, 1997. 
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Higher wages are also important for retaining good teachers. One study found that the likelihood of 
a teacher leaving the profession is closely related to relative wages41. The researchers estimate the 
elasticity of leaving a teaching job with respect to relative wages to be about –1.5, meaning an 
increase in teacher relative teacher wages of 10% would reduce the quit rate by 15%. 
We believe that if teachers were given the option of a more flexible promotion and pay system, it 
would have the potential to attract and retain more high quality applicants into the profession.   
Performance and professional development report 
School heads should be required to submit an annual report to Governors detailing the 
performance of their staff under this new performance and pay system, including their plans for 
professional development of teachers. Governors and inspectors need to ask how well they have 
used their powers to reward excellence and address under-performance at the school.  
School heads should be given a variety of options to manage struggling teachers. Initially, poor 
performance should be addressed through professional development and support. Research on 
professional development suggests that the right kind of approach can increase teacher quality 
significantly
42
.  
Heads should be encouraged to use their powers to prescribe specific training programmes for 
struggling teachers and the range of training resources should be expanded so that teachers receive 
the support they need to improve. In particular, schools should seek to develop a culture of 
feedback and best-practice sharing amongst teachers, and the teaching schools proposed in the 
recent White Paper should be required to develop mid-career training courses to address common 
problems highlighted in teacher evaluations.   
Where struggling teachers fail to improve over successive years, dismissal should also be considered. 
A recent survey commissioned by the Sutton Trust showed that the majority of senior teachers 
believe that there is not enough freedom for them to dismiss poorly performing teachers43, although 
other surveys suggest that part of the problem is that head teachers believe they need permission to 
do things that are already within their power.  
Other research evidence suggests that giving administrators more freedom to dismiss teachers who 
they feel are underperforming would increase pupil performance. Using a policy change in Chicago 
that allowed principals to dismiss probationary teachers without need for documentation or a court 
hearing, one study found that principals were significantly more likely to dismiss teachers with low 
value added scores or poor evaluations44. A further  study showed that training headmasters in value 
added measures and providing them with the appropriate data increased the probability that they 
would dismiss teachers with low value added estimates
45
. The research also found that schools 
which had dismissed teachers went on to improve more quickly than schools which had not. 
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Appendix: Table 1: Expenditure on Teachers and Support Staff 2009-10 (£bn) 
School Type 
Total Expenditure 
on teachers 
Total Expenditure 
on supply 
teachers 
Total Expenditure 
on educational 
support 
Total Gross 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
Primary £7.2 £0.5 £2.3 £14.4 
 50% 4% 16%  
Secondary £8.9 £0.3 £1.6 £15.9 
 56% 2% 10%  
Total £16.1 £0.8 £3,9 £30.2 
 53% 3% 13%  
Source Consistent Financial Reporting (CFR) Data 2009-10 
Table 2: Recruitment to Initial Teacher Training in England 
Year  2003/04  2004/05   2005/06   2006/07   2007/08   2008/09  2009/10 
        
Grand Total ITT 40,740 42,010 40,920 39,830 38,360 37,810 39,500 
      
College Based Courses      
Total 33,930 34,520 33,700 32,460 31,350 31,220 33,040 
Undergraduate 7,850 8,250 8,230 7,960 7,620 7,690 7,920 
Postgraduate 25,780 25,870 25,050 24,510 23,730 23,530 25,110 
   of which school 
centred 
1,540 1,740 1,760 1,730 1,650 1,650 1,810 
Fast Track 300 400 420 0 0 0 0 
      
Employment Based Courses      
Total 6,810 7,490 7,220 7,370 7,010 6,590 6,460 
GTP 5,230 5,470 5,490 5,360 5,300 5,120 5,110 
RTP 210 280 220 180 150 120 120 
OTTP 1,220 1,560 1,330 1,580 1,300 980 750 
Teach First 160 180 170 250 260 370 480 
Note: GTP – Graduate Teacher Programme, RTP – Registered Teacher Programme, OTTP-Overseas  
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Appendix: How the PISA figures were attained.  
We calculate how the performance of the students would be improved under different assumptions 
of teacher effectiveness whilst varying the proportion to be improved upon. We take a one standard 
deviation increase in teacher effectiveness to cause a 0.11 standard deviation increase in pupil 
scores as a lower bound and 0.2 increase as the upper bound. Assuming the distribution of teacher 
effectiveness to be normally distributed (0,1) we calculate the mean of the distribution after the 
bottom x% has been truncated (with the bottom 10% removed the new mean is 0.195). This is then 
multiplied by the effectiveness of teachers to obtain the gains in student achievement in standard 
deviations over the whole country in one year. Removing the bottom 10% increases student 
achievement by 0.021-0.039 standard deviations , using the upper and lower bounds. As this analysis 
applies to all teachers, so it can be thought of improving the effectiveness of teachers throughout 
the system. As such, it is assumed that the quality of teachers reinforces any gains that students 
make and the impacts of good instruction are not assumed to die out as the student progresses to a 
higher grade. Instead later teachers build upon the stronger average achievement of all children and 
set their instruction accordingly. Therefore this effect is then multiplied by the number of year that 
the student would be under the supervision of this truncated distribution of teachers (10years). 
Thereby improving student grades by 0.214-0.39 of a standard deviation.   
These gains are then converted into improvements in the UKs PISA scores, using the current mean 
and standard deviations in performance (Maths:492, 87 ; Reading: 494, 95; Science: 514, 99). 
